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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

STEVEN J. PYEATT,

:

Appellant/Petitioner.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Case No. 880274-CA
Priority No. 2

:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by
this Court on April 20, 1989.

Originally, this case was an appeal

from judgment and conviction for Unlawful Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1988);
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, to wit: Marijuana, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988); and Unlawful Possession of
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§58-37a-5(l) (1986), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup,
Judge, presiding.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts are set forth in Appellant's opening brief at
1-6.

INTRODUCTION
This petition for rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35
Utah Rules of the Court of Appeals.

In Brown v. Pickard, denying

rehfg, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established th
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court failed
to consider some material point in the case, or
that it erred in its conclusions . . . .
11 P. at 512.

Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913),

this Court added:
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter
of right, and we have no desire to discourage the
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in
proper cases. When this court, however, has
considered and decided all of the material
questions involved in a case, a rehearing should
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or
overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have
either misapplied or overlooked something which
materially affects the result . . . If there are
some reasons, however, such as we have indicated
above, or other good reasons, a petition for a
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.
Cummings, 129 P. at 624.

The argument section of this brief will

establish that, applying these standards, this petition for
rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted.

In

its opinion in State v. Pyeatt, Case No. 880274-CA, slip op. (filed
April 20, 1989) (attached as Addendum A ) , this Court overlooked
relevant case law and misconstrued and misapplied the facts and law
applicable to this case.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The affidavit failed to state sufficient facts to
establish probable cause on its face.

This Court's reliance on

State v. Hadd, 619 P.2d 1047 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) is misplaced
since the facts of Hadd are distinguishable.
Officer Droubay intentionally or recklessly made material
misrepresentations in the affidavit.

Absent those

misrepresentations, the affidavit fails to establish probable cause.
Rationale and precedent support Mr. Pyeatt's arguments
under the state constitution and require that this Court address the
state constitutional issues raised in this case.

ARGUMENT

POINT. THIS COURT MISCONSTRUED THE FACTS AND
MISAPPLIED THE LAW WHEN IT UPHELD THE SEARCH
WARRANT.
A.

THE AFFIDAVIT WAS FACIALLY DEFICIENT.

In its decision, this Court focused primarily on
Appellant's argument that the affidavit on its face failed to state
sufficient facts for a finding of probable cause.
at 1-4.

Pyeatt, slip op.

This Court relies on State v. Hadd, 619 P.2d 1047 (Ariz.

Ct. App. 1980), in reaching its decision that probable cause existed
on the face of the affidavit.

However, the facts in Hadd are

distinguishable from those in the instant case.
In Hadd, undercover officers drove a confidential

informant to the apartment of a known drug dealer.

A surveillance

unit followed the dealer to the Appellant's apartment, then back to
the dealer's apartment where the dealer gave a small bag of
marijuana to the CI and the agents.

The dealer then offered to sell

the agents an additional half pound of marijuana.

The surveillance

unit thereafter watched the dealer make a telephone call and drive
to Appellant's apartment.

After the dealer returned to his

apartment, officers arrested him and found a package of marijuana in
his vehicle.

The officers then immediately obtained a telephonic

search warrant for Appellant's apartment.
In the present case, the connection between Mr. Pyeatt's
home and the transaction which occurred at the Atherton address is
more attenuated than the connection between the Appellant's home and
the transaction in Hadd.

Several people were at the Atherton

address who could have supplied the drugs to the CI.

The two

transactions took place several days apart and the search warrant
was obtained several days after the second transaction.

In Hadd,

the dealer went to the Appellant's apartment twice in one evening,
the second time being immediately after offering a "sample" to the
officers.
The "totality of the circumstances" in this case did not
give rise to a reasonable belief that the officers would find
controlled substances in the Montgomery duplex.

Mr. Pyeatt

respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its decision on
this issue.

- 4
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B. MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS
INVALIDATED THE SEARCH WARRANT UNDER THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION.
In its decision, this Court briefly addressed the issue
of whether the material misrepresentations and omissions invalidated
the search warrant under the federal constitution.
(n.2), 3.

Slip op. at 2

While this Court acknowledges that the statement on that

affidavit that two controlled buys occurred at the Montgomery
address was "technically inaccurate," it does not discuss the
"inaccuracies" regarding whether the "dealer" or some unknown third
person was followed to the Montgomery address.
As set forth in Appellant's Reply Brief at 14-17, during
the first sixteen pages of his testimony, Officer Droubay clearly
and unequivocally testified that a third person other than the
dealer drove to the Montgomery address.

After Officer Droubay read

the affidavit, his testimony altered and he suggested that "Randy,"
the dealer who did business with the CI, was the same person who
drove to the Montgomery address.

Hence, Officer Droubay

significantly misrepresented the facts while under oath—either in
the affidavit or in the first several minutes of his testimony.
This Court fails to address those significant misrepresentations in
its opinion.
In addition, this Court determined that the trial judge's
finding that the misrepresentations were not made in bad faith was
not clearly erroneous and that "defendant has not presented any
compelling evidence that Droubay1s somewhat inaccurate and
incomplete statements were made knowingly, intentionally, or

- 5
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recklessly."

Slip op. at 4.

The statement fails to consider the

statement in State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986) that a law
enforcement officer is aware of the need for accuracy and
truthfulness in preparing an affidavit and that such awareness
should be taken into account when determining whether the officer
had the requisite intent when he included the falsehood.
Furthermore, it fails to consider the misleading nature of Droubay's
testimony and the abrupt change in testimony after the officer read
the affidavit and was reminded of the discrepancies between the
affidavit and his testimony.
Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have
acknowledged that this officer acted with "confusion, oversight or
ineptitude" (slip op. at 4) or "erred in judgment" (State v.
Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Utah 1988)), 1 but neither court has
been willing to scrutinize the convictions obtained as the result of
this officer's inappropriate actions.

An officer who misrepresents

the truth under oath is not likely to later acknowledge those
untruths, leaving a defendant with nothing other than circumstantial
evidence to establish the requisite intent.

At the very least, this

officer was reckless in including false statements as to the
location of bhe "controlled buys" and the identity of the person who

1 In Colonna, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
"defendant's criticisms of Droubay's behavior are justified
[footnote omitted]," but held that "the officer's conduct was not so
outrageous as to shock the conscience, nor was it fundamentally
repugnant to the American criminal justice system [citation
omitted]." 766 P.2d at 1065.
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drove to the Montgomery address.

A complete review of Officer

Droubay's testimony establishes that he had the requisite interest
in this case.
This Court further stated that it was "not convinced that
any of the statements defendant claims are false or wrongfully
omitted would be material to a determination of probable cause
[citation omitted]."

Slip op. at 4.

Contrary to this Court's

reasoning, if the person followed to the Montgomery address was in
no way linked to the buys at the Atherton address or the dealer at
that address, which appears to be the case based on the first
sixteen pages of Officer Droubay's testimony, there is no probable
cause to search the Montgomery address once the false statements are
excised.
Mr. Pyeatt respectfully requests that this Court
reconsider this issue and find that Officer Droubay intentionally or
recklessly included material misrepresentations in or excluded
material information from the affidavit.

C. RATIONALE AND PRECEDENT SUPPORT THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT.
In its opinion, this Court did not analyze Mr. Pyeatt's
argument that Article I, §14 of the state constitution was violated
in this case, and instead stated simply:
Because we find no precedent or rationale
compelling a different result under our state
constitution, we do not address this issue.
Slip op. at 4-5.

Contrary to this Court's assertion, case law and
rationale supporting a separate analysis exist in this case.
Appellant's argument under the state constitution was
that our constitution offers greater protection in a search and
seizure context than does its federal counterpart.

Historically,

such an argument makes sense since, at the time the Utah
Constitution was adopted, the State had recently outlawed polygamy
and federal troops were stationed in Utah to control activities.
Citizens of Utah, many of whom were practicing polygamy despite the
change in the law, had an interest in greater protections from
intrusions into their homes. Hence, history provides a rationale
for finding a greater protection under Article I, §14 of the Utah
Constitution than under the. fourth amendment to the federal
constitution.
Furthermore, Utah case law explicitly suggests the
possibility of a different construction for the Utah Constitution in
this specific context.
In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), the Court
pointed out that its decision that the falsehood contained in the
affidavit did not invalidate the search warrant was not dispositive
of how the issue might be resolved under Article I, §14 of the Utah
Constitution.

The Court acknowledged that "the federal law as it

has developed since Franks v. Delaware [438 U.S. 154 (1978)] is not
entirely adequate" and that w[t]here is no stronger argument for
developing adequate remedies for violation of the state and federal
constitutional prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizures

- 8 -

than the example of a police officer deliberately lying under oath
in order to obtain a search warrant."

Jj3. at 192-3.

Hence, an

analysis under the Utah Constitution distinct from that in Franks v.
Delaware is appropriate where misrepresentations are included in an
affidavit in support of a search warrant or omitted therefrom.
Furthermore, in Franks, the defendant "conceded that if
what is left is sufficient to sustain probable cause, the
inaccuracies are irrelevant" and that if "the warrant affiant had no
reason to believe the information was false, there was no violation
of the Fourth Amendment."

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. at 172.

Hence, the issue of whether an intentional or reckless
misrepresentation in an affidavit invalidates the search warrant and
the issue of the effect of a negligent misrepresentation were not
presented to the high court.
In addition to Utah case law explicitly suggesting the
possibility that the Utah search and seizure provision be
interpreted differently from its federal counterpart, case law from
other jurisdictions supports the separate analysis advanced by
Mr. Pyeatt.

Mr. Pyeatt's argument essentially was (1) intentional

misrepresentations should invalidate the warrant and (2) negligent
misrepresentations should be excised and the affidavit then reviewed
to determine whether probable cause exists absent the negligent
misrepresentations.
Cases decided prior to Franks v. Delaware, such as United
States v. Hunt, 496 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974), and United States v.
Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1974), held that "[i]f the affiant

intentionally makes false statements to mislead a judicial officer
on application for a warrant, these render the warrant invalid
regardless of whether or not such statements are material to
establishing probable cause."

Such a rationale makes sense since,

where an officer has intentionally misrepresented some facts in an
affidavit, the entire affidavit becomes suspect.
Since Franks, several courts have held that intentional
misrepresentations in an affidavit invalidate the entire affidavit
and warrant under a state constitutional analysis.

See e.g.

State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943, 946 (Alaska 1986); State v. Caldwell,
384 So.2d 431 (La. 1980); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal.. 1978).
In Cook, the Court noted:
Contrary to the case of negligent mistakes,
excision of deliberate falsehoods in an affidavit
does not leave the remaining allegations
unaffected and hence presumptively true. The fact
that the misstatements are intentional injects a
new element into the analysis, to wit, the
doctrine that a witness knowingly false in one
part of his testimony is to be distrusted in the
whole.
583 P.2d at 140.
The Court summed up that "although the court can excise
the intentionally false allegations it cannot presume the remainder
not be true.

Lacking a reliable factual basis in the affidavit, the

court has no alternative under settled constitutional principles but
to quash the warrant and exclude the product of search.
omitted.]"

[Citations

I_d. at 141.
Furthermore, there is case law from other jurisdictions

supporting Appellant's argument that negligent misrepresentations
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must be excised and the remaining portions of the affidavit
considered in determining whether to uphold the warrant.

See

People v. Theodor, 501 P.2d 234 (Cal. 1972} (modified on denial of
rehg); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978).
Hence, rationale and precedent both exist for deciding
the issue differently under the Utah Constitution.

Appellantfs

analysis under Article I, §14 is especially compelling since (1) a
review of the affidavit and Officer Droubay's testimony shows, by
circumstantial evidence, that Officer Droubay acted intentionally or
recklessly in putting together the affidavit, which would require
invalidation of the warrant without further analysis pursuant to
Appellantfs state constitutional theory, and (2) assuming, arguendo,
that Officer Droubay did not act intentionally or recklessly, the
negligence of including obviously false information would require
excision of that false information and therefore invalidate the
warrant.
Mr. Pyeatt respectfully requests that this Court rehear
this issue and address his state constitutional arguments.

CONCLUSION
Because this Court misconstrued and misapplied the facts
and the law and overlooked relevant precedent and rationale,
Mr. Pyeatt respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its
decision in this case and reverse his convictions and remand the
case for dismissal or a new trial absent the illegally seized
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evidence.
Respectfully submitted thi

day of May, 1989.
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State of Utah,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No

v.
Steven J

8802,3 4 CIA

Pyeatt,

Defendant and Appellant.

)

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Sheila McCleve; The Hon cable Kenneth Rigtrup
Attorneys:

Brooke C. Wells and Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Charlene Barlow, and Dan Larsen,
Salt Lake City, for Respondent

Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
In this appeal, defendant raises two related challenges
to his conviction.1 First, he claims Officer Droubay's
affidavit fails to allege sufficient facts upon which Judge
McCleve could base her finding of probable cause to issue the
search warrant. Second, defendant claims Judge Rigtrup erred
by denying defendants motion to suppress the cocaine and
related contraband found during the search of defendant's
house. We find no error and affirm defendant's conviction.
We first consider whether Officer Droubay's affidavit in
support of the search warrant established probable cause to
search defendant's residence
Defendant correctly
acknowledges
1. Defendant's third challenge, that the search warrant lacks
particularity, is without merit.

the scope of our review, which is limited to determining
whether Judge McCleve -had a substantial basis to conclude
that in the totality of the circumstances/ the affidavit
adequately established probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127/ 129 (Utah
1987) (per curiam). "Probable cause" in this context "is
nothing more than a reasonable belief that the evidence sought
is located at a place indicated by the policeman's
affidavit." United States v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1012/ 1014 (10th
Cir. 1982). Moreover/ we give great deference to Judge
McCleve's determination that probable cause existed for
issuing the warrant. See, e.g., Hansen, 732 P.2d at 129;
State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363/ 1364 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Defendant claims Droubay's affidavit is an insufficient
basis for the warrant because it (1) does not establish a
"fair probability" that cocaine was located at defendant's
residence/ (2) does not specifically and clearly establish the
basis for Droubay's attestation to the confidential
informant's reliability, and (3) is stale due to the length of
time between the last controlled buy and the issuance of the
warrant. We find no merit in any of these contentions. On
the contrary, our review of the affidavit convinces us that
Judge McCleve "had a substantial basis to conclude that in the
totality of the circumstances" probable cause existed to issue
the warrant.
Droubay's affidavit/ while somewhat inaccurate and
overstated in certain aspects/ nonetheless establishes a
pattern of "dealer/broker" drug trafficking. Droubay claims
that he and his fellow officers arranged two controlled buys
of cocaine at the Atherton apartment.2 on both occasions,
the "dealer" left the apartment and was followed by the
officers to defendant's residence. When the "dealer" returned
2. While one sentence in the affidavit states that the
cocaine was obtained from defendant's residence, we fail to
see how this technically inaccurate representation could have
misled Judge McCleve/ especially in light of the next thirteen
paragraphs discussing in detail the two controlled buys. The
affidavit contains a number of clear statements to the effect
that the "dealer" actually produced the cocaine at the
Atherton apartment/ but was believed to have retrieved it from
defendant's residence. We of course reject the suggestion
that Judge McCleve may not have carefully read the entire
affidavit.

880274-CA
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to the Atherton apartment, he delivered cocaine to the
confidential informant. On one of those occasions, the
informant received an incriminating telephone call from the
"dealer* during the time the officers knew the "dealer" was at
defendant's residence. This sequence of events establishes
probable cause to believe the "dealer" retrieved the cocaine
from defendant's residence, and that more cocaine and related
contraband could be found there. While the officers'
methodology is certainly not a model for a narcotics officer
training manual, we cannot say that Judge McCleve erred in
issuing the warrant. Defendant's specific challenges do not
change our conclusion.
First, we are not convinced that Judge McCleve erred
simply because the affidavit did not specifically allege that
cocaine had been seen in defendant's residence, nor that the
"dealer" ever stated he was going to defendant's residence to
get the drugs. See State v. Hadd, 127 Ariz. 270, 619 P.2d
1047, 1053 (Ct. App. 1980) (probable cause to search
"broker's" house was established by an affidavit alleging that
drugs were found in "dealer's" car immediately after he was
seen leaving "broker's" house). While such particular
allegations would certainly be helpful in establishing
probable cause, defendant cites no authority rendering them
mandatory. In fact, we think such an inflexible approach is
inconsistent with the totality of the circumstances standard.
Second, we do not find it significant that the warrant
was issued after only two controlled buys, see Hadd, 619 P.2d
at 1049-50, 1053, or that the last buy possibly took place two
weeks before the warrant was obtained. See State v. Hansen,
732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987). While at least one case
suggests in dicta that perhaps two trips to the "brokerfsM
house by the "dealer" during controlled buys would be
insufficient to establish probable cause, State v. witwer, 642
P.2d 828, 832 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), that case was not
decided under a "totality of the circumstances" standard. We
decline to adopt the "three-buy minimum" defendant, in effect,
proposes. Instead, affidavits in support of search warrants
must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. The totality of the
circumstances alleged in Droubay's affidavit, coupled with two
controlled buys, is sufficient to establish probable cause to
search defendant's residence.
Finally, we cannot agree that the warrant was improperly
issued because much of the information contained in the
affidavit was relayed to Droubay by a confidential informant,

880274-CA
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or perhaps even by other officers. See State v. Nielsen, 727
P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1986) ("The use of hearsay evidence to
establish probable cause does not necessarily undercut the
validity of a warrant-"), cert, denied. 480 U.S. 930 (1986).
Droubay stated that his informant was reliable and based his
attestation on specific prior experiences with the informant.
Defendant has not convinced us that Judge McCleve erred in
concluding Droubay's affidavit demonstrated informant
reliability. See, e.g., State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099,
1102 (Utah 1985) (informant's veracity can be established
through an affidavit stating that the informant has previously
given reliable information).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold Judge McCleve did not
err in issuing the warrant based on Droubay's affidavit.
Our final inquiry is whether Judge Rigtrup erred in not
suppressing the evidence. We will affirm this ruling unless
the factual assessment underlying it is clearly erroneous.
State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). A trial
court's factual assessment is not clearly erroneous unless our
review of the evidence leaves us with a "definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made." id. (quoting
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.. 395 U.S. 100,
123 (1969)). Defendant takes exception to Judge Rigtrup*s
ruling that Droubay did not act in "bad faith." Implicitly,
Judge Rigtrup concluded that Droubay did not knowingly,
intentionally, or recklessly include false statements or omit
material information in his affidavit. See State v. Slowe,
728 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1985). We are not persuaded that this
ruling is clearly erroneous.
Defendant has not presented any compelling evidence that
Droubay's somewhat inaccurate and incomplete statements were
made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly. We find it more
likely that the misstatements were the result of Droubay's
confusion, oversight, or ineptitude, not the result of a plan
to mislead Judge McCleve. In any case, we are not convinced
that any of the statements defendant claims are false or
wrongfully omitted would be material to a determination of
probable cause. See id. at 111 (minor discrepancies in
affidavit "did not undermine the essential truth of the
allegations"). The basic facts we hold to establish probable
cause are essentially undisputed.
Because we find no precedent or rationale compelling a
different result under our state constitution, we do not
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address the issue
conviction.

Accordingly, we affirm defendant's

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

|A|1:

,.0NCUR;

RiclTSfrcTl^ Davidson, Judge

Russell W, Bench# Judge
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